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The evolution of indirect reciprocity 
under action and assessment 
generosity
Laura Schmid1*, Pouya Shati2, Christian Hilbe3 & Krishnendu Chatterjee1
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This 
mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. 
Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests 
that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. 
Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social 
norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the 
predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust 
by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of 
generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to 
group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals 
occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-
based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the 
resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows 
defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. 
However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full 
cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the 
most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social 
norms.
People tend to put in time and effort to achieve and maintain a good standing with those that surround  them1–4. 
This human concern for a good reputation can be an important motivation to engage in cooperative behavior: 
Once somebody’s reputation is at stake, people have more of an incentive to engage in costly acts of help-
ing  others5–10. This reputation-based mechanism for the evolution of cooperation is referred to as indirect 
 reciprocity11–14. In contrast to direct  reciprocity15–18, which is based on repeated interactions between the same 
players, indirect reciprocity does not require any two individuals to interact with one another more than once. 
Instead it only requires population members to continually assess each others’ actions, and to act based on these 
reputations. Whereas direct reciprocity is based on individual memories of interactions with a given group 
member, indirect reciprocity builds upon a group’s collective memories.
In order to analyze the process by which reputations evolve, the literature on indirect reciprocity considers 
certain social dilemma  situations11–14. In the simplest case, each dilemma situation involves only two population 
members, who are referred to as ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’, respectively. The donor is asked whether or not to pay 
a personal cost to provide help to the recipient. The two possible actions of either offering help or refusing help 
are interpreted as cooperation and defection, respectively. While the recipient does not make any decisions, the 
donor’s action is observed by other population members. These observers then decide how the donor’s reputation 
should be updated in light of their behavior.
How observers update reputations, and how donors decide whom to help, depends on the social norm applied 
in the population. These social norms consist of two components. First, the social norm’s assessment rule specifies 
which behaviors of the donor should improve the donor’s reputation, and which behaviors should be condemned. 
Second, the social norm’s action rule tells the donor whether or not to help the recipient; this decision may in 
turn depend on the recipient’s and the donor’s current reputation. A well-known example of a social norm is 
‘Image Scoring’19–21. According to the assessment rule of image scoring, a donor’s reputation should improve 
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every time the donor cooperates, and it should deteriorate every time the donor defects. According to its action 
rule, a donor should only cooperate with those recipients who are sufficiently well-reputed. Importantly, the social 
norm of Image Scoring has the property that assessments only depend on whether or not the donor cooperated. 
Social norms with this property are sometimes referred to as ‘first-order’ norms. While this basic principle of 
first-order norms may appear intuitive, Image Scoring has been shown to be  unstable22–24. The reason for this 
instability is that individuals are required to defect against an ill-reputed group member; yet by doing so, they 
harm their own reputation. To overcome this inconsistency, it has been argued that stable norms of indirect 
reciprocity need to be sufficiently complex to differentiate between justified and unjustified acts of  defection22,23.
To identify such stable cooperative norms, the landmark papers by Ohtsuki and  Iwasa25,26 consider an even 
simpler decision situation. In their setup, reputations are required to be binary, such that individuals can either 
be ‘good’ or ‘bad’. For this binary model of reputations, they allow for up to all ‘third-order’ assessment rules. In 
addition to the donor’s action, third-order assessments may also depend on the current reputation of the donor 
and the recipient. For example, while helping a good recipient may be assessed as good, the very same action 
towards a bad recipient may be assessed as bad. With an exhaustive search on the space of all third-order norms, 
Ohtsuki and Iwasa identified eight successful norms that can maintain cooperation, which they coined the “lead-
ing eight”. All leading eight norms agree that a cooperative action towards a good recipient should yield a good 
reputation, whereas a defecting action towards a good recipient should yield a bad reputation. The norms differ, 
however, in how they evaluate interactions with a bad recipient. While some norms find it acceptable if help is 
provided to a bad recipient, other norms like ‘Stern Judging’27 condemn such behaviors completely.
The findings of Ohtsuki and Iwasa have been hugely influential for the further development of the  field27–32, 
yet they are based on a number of important assumptions. One of their key assumptions is that reputations are 
assigned publicly. This means that after any interaction between a donor and recipient, it is a central authority 
that assigns an updated reputation to the donor; this publicly assigned reputation is then adopted by the entire 
population. As a consequence, the views of different individuals are always perfectly correlated: if a given group 
member is considered to be good by one individual, they are also considered to be good by anyone else. The 
assumption of public information greatly facilitates the mathematical analysis of indirect reciprocity. However, it 
cannot capture scenarios in which individuals make their own judgments, based on their own private informa-
tion. When individuals make their own judgments, they may start to disagree about which reputation they assign 
to a given group member. Such disagreements can arise, for example, when individuals differ in which interac-
tions they observe, or when they occasionally misinterpret a given interaction. Once such disagreements arise, 
they can further proliferate, because individuals now also perceive all future interactions of that group member 
 differently33–35. For private, scarce, and incomplete information, individual-based simulations thus suggest that 
the leading-eight social norms no longer effectively promote the evolution of  cooperation36.
This finding naturally calls for mechanisms to mitigate the effect of noisy environments and private informa-
tion on indirect  reciprocity37,38. Here we explore the effect of a particular mechanism, generosity. The value of 
generosity has previously been stressed in the literature on direct  reciprocity39–43. For example, by occasionally 
cooperating against defectors, the strategy ‘Generous Tit-for-Tat’ can stabilize full  cooperation39,40, even though 
the classical Tit-for-Tat strategy cannot. Similarly, the analogous first-order social norm ‘Generous Scoring’ has 
been shown to be stable in the context of indirect  reciprocity44, even though classical Image Scoring is not. In 
both cases, there is the same intuition for why a certain degree of generosity is favorable. By becoming more 
generous, populations of reciprocators are more likely to sustain cooperation among themselves even in noisy 
environments. This in turn makes them more robust against invasion by unconditional cooperators. At the same 
time, however, reciprocators must not be too forgiving, for otherwise they can be invaded by unconditional 
defectors. The optimal degree of generosity thus needs to strike a balance between being sufficiently forgiving 
to correct errors, and being sufficiently strict to avoid exploitation.
In the following, we propose a framework to incorporate an element of generosity into the leading eight social 
norms. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. The first, assessment generosity, makes 
individuals more generous when assigning reputations to other group members. In situations in which they 
would usually assign a bad reputation to a given group member, they may occasionally assign a good reputa-
tion instead. The second, action generosity, makes individuals more generous in their decisions whom to help 
as a donor. In situations in which they would usually defect, they may occasionally cooperate instead. Although 
these two kinds of generosity may seem similar, our results suggest that their effect on the resulting reputation 
dynamics is very different. In particular, while action generosity can sometimes enhance cooperation, assessment 
generosity is always detrimental. Moreover, even under action generosity, we do not observe the evolution of 
high cooperation rates when environments are noisy. Our results suggest that complex social norms of indirect 
reciprocity are not compatible with individual acts of generosity. Unless generosity is the result of a coordinated 
effort among all population members, generosity merely acts as another seed of disagreement.
Results
A theoretical framework of action and assessment generosity. To incorporate generosity into 
higher-order social norms of indirect reciprocity, we consider a well-mixed population of fixed size N. In every 
round, two players are randomly chosen to engage in an interaction. One of the players is randomly assigned 
to be the donor, whereas the other player is assigned to be the recipient. The donor chooses whether to confer 
a benefit b to the recipient, at an own cost of c, with 0<c<b . Other members of the population independently 
observe the donor’s decision with probability q. We assume that information is private: every observer keeps 
track of others’ reputations by updating their personal reputation repository, and there is no shared judgment of 
observed actions (see “Methods”). Players thus individually update and keep track of their opinion about others 
3
Vol.:(0123456789)
Scientific Reports |        (2021) 11:17443  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
based on their observations. These observations are subject to noise: observers can misperceive an action with a 
probability ε , and mistakenly interpret e.g. cooperation as defection.
How observers update others’ reputation based on what they observe, and how they subsequently act towards 
others, is governed by their social norm. We broadly interpret social norms as rules that tell individuals how 
they should behave in social interactions. In our context, we consider norms that consist of two components: an 
assessment rule and an action  rule14. The assessment rule prescribes how reputations are updated, based on the 
observed actions and the possible context of an interaction. The action rule governs a player’s behavior when it 
is their turn to decide whether to confer a benefit to a co-player. Following Ohtsuki and  Iwasa25,26, we assume 
that reputations are binary (good or bad), and social norms are at most third order. To allow for generosity, we 
consider modified versions of the deterministic leading eight social norms L1–L8 (see Fig. 1a). Players with 
these modified versions always cooperate if the original leading eight prescribe to do so. Similarly, they always 
assign a good reputation in cases where the original version would. However, in cases where the original social 
norm would assign a bad reputation, the modified version instead assigns a good reputation with probability 
g1 (Fig. 1b,c). Analogously, in cases where the original leading eight norm prescribes defection, the modified 
version instead cooperates with probability g2 (Fig. 1d,e). We refer to g1 and g2 as the probabilities that players 
engage in assessment generosity and action generosity, respectively. In the limiting case with g1=g2=0 , we 
recover the original leading eight.
We note that our framework makes two assumptions about the stochasticity we introduce. For one, players 
are only forgiving, but not spiteful: players never defect when the original leading eight rule prescribes coopera-
tion, and they never assign a bad reputation to a player they are supposed to regard as good. This means that 
only when the original norm prescribes a negative assessment or defection, there is a probability to positively 
assess ( g1 ) or cooperate ( g2 ) instead. Another simplifying assumption is that players use the same probability g1 
for all instances in which assessment generosity can be applied (similarly, they use the same probability g2 for all 
instances in which action generosity can be applied). For example, an observer with social norm Stern Judging 
(or L6) makes no distinction between a player who cooperates with a bad recipient and a player who defects with 
a good recipient. In both cases, the observer generously assigns a good reputation with probability g1.
Reputation dynamics under assessment generosity. In the following, we first explore each kind of 
generosity in isolation. We start by considering the effects of assessment generosity. To this end, we first take 
the players’ norms as given. Different players may adopt different norms, but each player’s social norm is fixed 





 . This image matrix represents a collection of the players’ reputation repositories. An entry 
mij(t)=1 indicates that player i assigns a good reputation to j at time t. Similarly, an entry mij(t)=0 indicates 
that i regards j as bad. After every round of the game, M(t) is updated. The updated image matrix depends on 
which players are chosen to be the donor and the recipient, on the donor’s action, on who observes the interac-
Figure 1.  The leading eight social norms with assessment and action generosity. (a) To sustain cooperation 
based on indirect reciprocity, Ohtsuki and  Iwasa26 suggested a set of eight social norms. Each social norm 
consists of an assessment rule and an action rule. The assessment rule determines with which probability 
observers assign a good reputation to a given donor. This assessment depends on the donor’s action 
(cooperation or defection) and on the reputations of the donor and the recipient (good or bad). The action rule 
determines with which probability a donor cooperates with a given recipient. Again, this choice depends on the 
reputation of the donor and the recipient. The original leading eight social norms are deterministic, such that all 
probabilities are either zero or one. In our framework, we introduce stochasticity by allowing individuals to be 
generous. We distinguish two kinds of generosity. (b,c) Assessment generosity means that every time individuals 
usually assign a bad reputation, they instead assign a good reputation with probability g1 . (d,e) Action generosity 
means that every time individuals usually defect, they instead cooperate with probability g2.
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tion, and on the social norms applied by the observers. For example, if an individual j is regarded as good by 
all players, but j defects against some other good individual, then some of the entries of the image matrix may 
change from mij(t)=1 to mij(t+1)=0.
Let us illustrate the concept of image matrices with an example. To this end, we consider a population that in 
equal proportions applies one of the social norms L1 , ALLC, ALLD. Here, ALLC is the (trivial) social norm that 
assigns a good reputation to all behaviors, and that prescribes to cooperate with everyone. Similarly, ALLD is the 
norm that uniformly assigns bad reputations and that always prescribes to defect. We consider four scenarios, 
depending on whether or not information is noisy, and depending on whether or not L1 displays some assessment 
generosity (Fig. 2a). In the baseline case of no noise and no generosity, we observe that L1 perfectly distinguishes 
between different players. Eventually, all L1 players assign a good reputation to each other and to all unconditional 
cooperators, whereas they assign a bad reputation to all defectors. Once we allow for perception errors, however, 
there is no longer a perfect match between the players’ norms and their reputations. For instance, there is now 
a 7.5% chance that L1 players regard an ALLD opponent as good despite their constant defection. Similarly, L1 
players now consider each other as bad with an average probability of 11.6% (Fig. 2b). Given that the error rate 
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Figure 2.  The effect of assessment generosity on the dynamics of reputations. (a) Image matrices are 
representations of how players assess each other at any given time. To depict these image matrices graphically, 
a colored dot means that the corresponding row player attributes a good image to the corresponding column 
player. Here, we show snapshots of such image matrices when players either use the leading-eight social norm 
L1 , ALLC, or ALLD (in equal proportions). We consider four scenarios. These scenarios differ in whether 
information is perfect or noisy, and in whether or not L1 players are generous. When information is perfect 
and there is no generosity, we observe that the reputation assignments of different L1 players are perfectly 
correlated. If one L1 player assigns a good reputation to some other group member, then so does every other L1 
player. In contrast, the presence of either noise or generosity introduces disagreements among L1 players. (b) 
Here, we show the average image players have of one another. Generosity makes L1 players perceive each other 
less favorably, and it makes them perceive ALLD players more favorably, irrespective of whether information 
is perfect or noisy. (c,d) We observe similar patterns for all other leading eight social norms. Here we illustrate 
the competition between L7 , ALLC, and ALLD. Parameters: We use a population of size N=90 , an error rate of 
either ε=0 or ε=0.05 , and a generosity probability of either g1=0 or g1=0.05 . Simulations are run for 2 · 106 
iterations, and the initial image matrix assumes a good reputation for all players.
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original disagreements caused by errors trigger further disagreements over  time36. It is exactly this excess in bad 
assessments that generosity might help to reduce.
Surprisingly, we find that assessment generosity rather has the opposite effect. It further increases the mis-
match between the players’ social norms and their reputations (Fig. 2a, right panels). Even in the absence of 
errors, generosity increase the likelihood that L1 players regard each other as bad (from 0 to 4.1%). Similarly, 
it increases the likelihood that L1 players have a positive image of ALLD opponents ( 7.2% instead of 0%). This 
mismatch becomes even worse when errors and generosity act simultaneously (Fig. 2a,b, lower right panels). 
Now, 12.5% of L1 players regard each other as bad, while they assign a good reputation to defectors in 13.9% of 
the cases. In particular, independent of whether or not there are errors, we observe that generosity undermines 
the accuracy of L1 to assign correct reputations: (i) With and without errors, generosity reduces the likelihood that 
members of the L1 subpopulation regard each other as good; (ii) With and without errors, generosity increases 
the likelihood that L1 players assign a good reputation to defectors. We observe the same negative trend for all 
other leading eight norms (as another example, the case of L7 is depicted in Fig. 2c,d).
To gain some intuition for these results, Fig. S1a considers a stylized example with three L1 players and 
one ALLD player. Due to assessment generosity, some L1 players may assign a good reputation to the defector 
(Fig. S1a, second panel). This can have two negative consequences for the relative performance of L1 : (i) Gen-
erous players provide help to the defector (Fig. S1a, second and third panel); (ii) They assign bad reputations 
to fellow L1 players who do not show the same generosity (Fig. S1a, fourth panel). In this way, uncoordinated 
generosity can itself act as a seed of disagreement between generally cooperative players. Both of these effects 
of assessment generosity seem to undermine the robustness of the leading-eight norms in mixed populations, 
rather than enhancing it.
Reputation dynamics under action generosity. In a similar way, we can also explore the isolated 
effects of action generosity. To this end, we again consider populations that consist in equal proportions of L1 , 
ALLC, and ALLD, and we compare the outcomes with and without errors, and with and without action generos-
ity (Fig. 3a). In contrast to assessment generosity, we observe that action generosity does not compromise the 
perceptions that L1 players have of each other. In the absence of errors, all L1 players regard each other as good, 
with or without action generosity (Fig. 3b, upper two panels). Once there are perception errors, action generos-
ity can even improve L1 ’s self-perception. Instead of regarding each other as bad with an average probability of 
11.6% (in the case of errors but no generosity), L1 players assign each other a bad reputation in 10.9% of the 
cases (with action generosity). Similarly, the chance to misperceive ALLD players as good is slightly diminished. 
L1 players regard 7.5% of their ALLD opponents as good without generosity, compared to 7.4% with generosity 
(note, however, that under action generosity, an L1 player may cooperate with ALLD players even when they have 
a bad reputation).
To gain some intuition for the differences between assessment generosity and action generosity, we revisit our 
previous stylized example with three L1 players and one ALLD player (Fig. S1b). Similar to assessment generosity, 
we again observe that action generosity may lead L1 players to cooperate with defectors (Fig. S1b, second and 
third panel). However, action generosity no longer seeds additional disagreements among the L1 players (Fig. S1a, 
fourth panel). The main difference between assessment and action generosity is that instances of action generosity 
become common knowledge. Cooperating with a defector is a decision that others can see, whereas assigning a 
good reputation to a defector is a private decision which can lead to future misunderstandings.
These results suggest that with respect to the robustness of L1 , action generosity results in a trade-off. On the 
one hand, action generosity makes it more likely that L1 players cooperate among each other when information is 
noisy. On the other hand, however, action generosity also increases the chance that help is given to undeserving 
defectors. Similar trade-offs can also be observed for other leading-eight norms (Fig. 3c,d shows the example 
of L7 ). Whether the overall effect of this trade-off is favorable to the robustness of indirect reciprocity depends 
on the overall composition of the population. In populations in which leading eight players are abundant, the 
positive effects of increased forgiveness may outweigh the negative effects of providing help to free riders. In an 
evolutionary context, this composition of the population can change over time, depending on the relative suc-
cess of each social norm. How generosity affects this evolutionary dynamics is what we explore in the following.
Evolutionary dynamics under assessment and action generosity. While we have assumed in the 
previous sections that the population members use fixed social norms, here we consider how the abundance 
of different social norms may change over time. We assume that the evolution of social norms happens on 
a separate, much larger timescale than the updating of reputations. As a result, we may assume that by the 
time social norms change, the players’ reputations have reached a stationary state (as depicted by the average 
image matrices in Fig. 2b,d and 3b,d). Given these average images, we can compute the cooperation rate x̂ij with 





j �=i bx̂ji − cx̂ij . If a social norm allows a player to have a relatively high payoff, such a social norm is 
more likely to spread in a population on an evolutionary timescale.
To describe how successful social norms spread in a population, we consider a simple imitation dynamics 
based on pairwise  comparison45,46. In every time step of the evolutionary process, some player i is randomly 
selected from the population to revise their social norm. With probability µ , player i picks a new norm uni-
formly at random. With probability 1− µ , he instead chooses a role model j randomly from the remaining 
population. In that case, player i adopts j’s social norm with a probability given by the Fermi  function47–49, 
P(πi ,πj)=(1+exp[−s(πj−πi)])
−1 . Here, the parameter s≥0 describes the strength of selection, which measures 
how relevant payoffs are for updating the norms. For s=0 , updating happens at random. For increasing s, social 
norms with higher payoffs are increasingly likely to be imitated. The resulting stochastic process is ergodic, and 
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gives rise to a stationary distribution, called selection-mutation equilibrium. The average cooperation rate or 
payoff in the population can be computed from there by weighting the payoffs of the individual norms with their 
abundance in equilibrium. In the following, we assume mutations are sufficiently rare, such that populations are 
homogenous most of the  time50–52. Only occasionally, a mutant social norm arises. This mutant norm is then 
either adopted by the entire population or it goes extinct before the next mutant appears. To furthermore keep the 
system as simple as possible, we study the evolutionary competition between three social norms only: players can 
choose between ALLC, ALLD, and one of the leading eight social norms (similar to what we studied in the previ-
ous sections and again similar to much of the previous work in the  field20–23,38,53,54). For all details, see “Methods”.
Figure 4a shows the resulting dynamics for the leading eight norm L1 in the baseline case without any 
 generosity36. Overall, L1 is only played in 30% of the cases, as compared to 4.3% for ALLC, and 65.8% for ALLD. 
While L1 is relatively robust against direct invasion by ALLD , it is vulnerable to indirect invasion by ALLC. Over-
all, the dynamics is similar to a rock-paper-scissors cycle: ALLC mutants are favored to invade into L1 , ALLD is 
favored to invade into ALLC, and L1 can invade ALLD in turn. However, due to the relative robustness of ALLD, 
players only cooperate in a minority of cases. Adding a moderate amount of either assessment generosity (Fig. 4b) 
or action generosity (Fig. 4c) leaves the qualitative dynamics unchanged. However, both kinds of generosity make 
L1 slightly more robust against invasion by ALLC, but less likely to invade into ALLD, as one may expect. The 
overall effect is slightly negative in the case of action generosity (the share of defectors increases from 65.8% to 
67.0%), and substantially negative in the case of assessment generosity (where the share of defectors increases 
to 78.6%). For the given parameter values, we thus conclude that neither form of generosity favors the evolution 
of the social norm L1.
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Figure 3.  The effect of action generosity on the reputation dynamics. We consider the same basic setup as in 
Fig. 2, except that leading eight players now use action generosity instead of assessment generosity. (a,b) When 
the population consists of L1 , ALLC, and ALLD, action generosity results in more appropriate judgments. In 
the presence of errors, generosity makes L1 players more likely to perceive each other as good (89.1% instead 
of 88.4%). Similarly, it makes them slightly less likely to perceive defectors as good (7.4% instead of 7.5%). 
Importantly, however, L1 players with action generosity occasionally cooperate with ALLD opponents even if 
they regard them as bad. (c,d) We observe the same patterns for other leading eight norms. Here we again depict 
the case of L7 . Parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.
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This conclusion, however, can change for other leading eight social norms. To illustrate this point, Fig. 4e–h 
shows the resulting dynamics when ALLC and ALLD compete with the alternative norm L7 . The overall dynam-
ics is similar to the case of L1 , with evolution leading in a rock-paper-scissors cycle from L7 to ALLC to ALLD 
and back to L7 . Also the impact of generosity is similar. On the one hand, it reduces the risk of L7 with respect 
to indirect invasions by ALLC; but on the other hand, it also reduces L7 ’s ability to invade into ALLD. However, 
for L7 we observe that the net result of these two opposing effects can be positive. In the case of action generos-
ity, the share of L7 increases to 27.4% (compared to 24.3% in the baseline scenario without any generosity). We 
note however that even in this case, in which generosity is favorable, the population is still most likely to settle 
at unconditional defection.
To explore how robust these patterns are, we have repeated these simulations for all other leading eight social 
norms, and we have systematically varied how likely the leading eight are to engage in either assessment or action 
generosity (Fig. 5). These simulations exhibit the following regularities: (i) In the presence of noise, almost all 
of the leading eight norms have problems to evolve, irrespective of how generous they are. The only social norm 
that is able to reach an abundance of more than 50% is L2 (called ‘consistent standing’36). However, this social 
norm is most successful without generosity, when g1=g2= 0 . (ii) In those cases in which the leading eight norm 
is played by a sizable fraction of the population ( L1 , L2 , L7 ), assessment generosity has a systematically negative 
effect on overall cooperation. In contrast, action generosity can promote cooperation, but only in the case of 
L7 , for which the optimal degree of generosity is g2≈8% . However, even in that case, cooperation rates remain 
comparably low. For all other leading eight norms ( L3-L6 , L8 ), cooperation fails to evolve altogether.
We observe similar results as we vary the error rate ε , the benefit b of cooperation, and the observation rate 
q (Fig. 6). In all cases, cooperation is unlikely to evolve. Moreover, generosity seems to harm the evolution of 
cooperation rather than enhancing it (Fig. S2), despite its positive effect in homogeneous populations (Fig. S3).
Discussion
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation that translates the principle of direct reciprocity to a popu-
lation  level11–14. When individuals use direct reciprocity, they ask how cooperative others have been in direct 
encounters. In contrast, when individuals use indirect reciprocity, they ask how others have behaved in general, 
in interactions with third parties. Once individuals take into account third party interactions, they also need to 
develop a sense of which behaviors should be regarded as bad, and which consequences bad reputations should 
have. In this way, indirect reciprocity has become the subfield of evolutionary game theory that explores the 
evolution of moral  behavior1. To explore these questions, Ohtsuki and  Iwasa25,26 have suggested eight social 
norms that can maintain cooperation. Their work, however, rests on the assumption that reputations are assigned 
Figure 4.  Evolution of the leading eight under assessment and action generosity. We simulate the evolutionary 
dynamics when players can choose among three different norms, a leading eight norm, ALLC, and ALLD. 
Social norms spread in the population according to a pairwise comparison  process45, such that norms of players 
with high payoffs are more likely to spread. Here we depict results for the limit of rare mutations, such that 
populations are homogeneous most of the  time50–52. Numbers in circles show how often each social norm is 
adopted on average. Arrows indicate how likely other social norms can invade a given resident population. 
Solid arrows indicate that the respective transition is more likely to occur than expected under neutrality, 
whereas dotted arrows indicate that the respective transition is comparably unlikely. We consider four scenarios, 
depending on whether leading eight players exhibit no generosity, only assessment generosity, only action 
generosity, or both variants of generosity. (a–d) The norm L1 is most abundant without any generosity. (e–h) 
The norm L7 is most abundant with action generosity. However, even in that case, it is played in less than 30% of 
time. Parameters: N=50 , ε=0.05 , b=5 , c=1 , q=0.9 , using a strength of selection of s=1.
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publicly. In their framework it is a central authority that takes note of everyone’s behavior, and that assigns a 
good or a bad reputation in turn. In contrast, when population members make their own judgments and when 
information is noisy, Ohtsuki and Iwasa’s leading eight become less effective in sustaining  cooperation33–36. 
Noise can introduce initial disagreements, such that different individuals assign different reputations to a given 
group member. Such disagreements can proliferate, because they also affect how future interactions of that group 
member are interpreted. As a result, minor initial disagreements can sometimes lead to a complete separation of 
the population. In such cases, the population fragments into distinct subpopulations that assign good reputations 
within their community and bad reputations to all outgroup  members55.
Here, we have explored whether the leading eight social norms can be made more robust if they are equipped 
with an element of generosity. We distinguish two ways of being generous. When individuals engage in assess-
ment generosity, they are more likely to assign a good reputation to someone they would usually regard as bad. 
When individuals engage in action generosity, they are more likely to cooperate with someone against whom 
they would usually defect. Although these two manifestations of generosity may follow a similar motive, our 
results suggest that they have different consequences. Assessment generosity leads to a private reassessment of 
somebody’s reputation. Unless this reassessment is mutually agreed upon, it can seed additional disagreements 
within a population. These disagreements can further undermine the robustness of the leading eight norms. 
In contrast, action generosity leads to a public display of cooperative behavior. While such generous acts may 
be misguided towards undeserving free riders, they do not generate the mutual disagreements that assessment 
generosity is susceptible to. As a result, we find that the effect of assessment generosity on cooperation is always 
negative, whereas action generosity can sometimes enhance cooperation. But even then, the leading eight norms 
have problems to sustain full cooperation in noisy environments.
We note here that the case of fully private, individual observations and reputation tracking constitutes an 
extreme case just as much as fully public information. We assume that for a more realistic model, the truth lies 
somewhere in the  middle56. For example, gossip and communication help offset and mediate disagreements. Still, 
for a full understanding of the dynamics of indirect reciprocity, it should be useful to first explore the extreme 
cases. If not for practical reasons, these cases are still relevant because of their theoretical merit as boundary cases.
Figure 5.  A systematic analysis of the effect of generosity on cooperation. For this figure, we repeat the 
evolutionary simulations shown in Fig. 4 for all leading eight norms. To explore the impact of generosity, we 
systematically vary how likely leading eight players exhibit assessment generosity ( g1 , y-axis) and how likely 
the exhibit action generosity ( g2 , x-axis). The color indicates the average cooperation rate of the population, 
according to the selection-mutation equilibrium of the evolutionary process (see “Methods”). In particular, grey 
indicates the absence of cooperation. We find that the five social norms L3 − L6 and L8 , which fail to evolve in 
the baseline deterministic model ( g1=g2=0 ), do not evolve in any generous form either, no matter in which 
combination. The norms L1 and L2 occasionally evolve, but they do not benefit from either form of generosity. 
Here, the achieved cooperation rate has its maximum in the origin. Only for L7 , the cooperation rate becomes 
maximal for a positive amount of action generosity, with g2≈0.08 . The inserts show the cooperation rate as a 
function of g2 for g1=0 . Parameters are the same as in Fig. 4.
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The failure of generosity to enhance cooperation may seem surprising. After all, previous work on direct 
reciprocity has shown that generosity is a powerful mechanism to reestablish mutual cooperation in the pres-
ence of  noise39–43. Also among first-order social norms of indirect reciprocity, generosity can help to stabilize 
Figure 6.  Generosity does not enhance the evolution of cooperation even when we vary parameter values. 
We vary the noise on observations ε , the benefit-to-cost ratio b/c, with c = 1 , and observation probability q. 
All other parameters remain constant at the values of Fig. 2. In each scenario, we plot the average cooperation 
rate of each individual leading eight norm when they compete against ALLD and ALLC. This again enables 
us to compare the generous Li (b–d) in three variants with their baseline counterparts (a). (b) For assessment 
generosity only, we find that compared to the baseline, the cooperation rate of the leading eight with generosity 
is reduced for all values of ε , b/c and q. The qualitative shape of the curves remains the same as in the case of no 
generosity. (c) In the case of action generosity only, the negative effect on cooperation rates is not as large as with 
assessment generosity. Yet, action generosity still fails to enhance cooperation, and is also detrimental for some 
parameter ranges, especially higher values of ε and b/c. (d) For the leading eight with both kinds of generosity, 
cooperation rates are lowest across all parameter ranges and scenarios. Again, the shape of the curve is identical 
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 cooperation44. Our study can shed light on why generosity is conducive to cooperation in those cases, while it 
is detrimental in the case of the leading eight norms. For the leading eight norms, generosity entails a two-fold 
cost. The first cost is the immediate cost c that comes with any cooperative act. The second cost is the risk of 
losing one’s reputation by providing help to someone others regard as bad. In contrast, Generous Tit-for-Tat and 
Generous Scoring do not suffer from such a two-fold cost. Although the direct act of cooperating with someone 
is still costly, cooperators always obtain a good reputation. The optimal level of generosity in this case can be 
calculated by requiring that the positive reputation effect matches the negative immediate cost of  cooperation44.
To model the impact of generosity, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. For one, we have con-
sidered a well-mixed population. While the assumption of well-mixed populations is common in the indirect 
reciprocity  literature11–13,19,25,26,36 interesting effects may arise once a population’s network structure is taken 
into account. In the context of indirect reciprocity, this population structure may not only determine with 
whom players interact with, but also whose interactions they are able to observe. While population structure 
can enhance the evolution of cooperation in  general57–60, it remains to be shown how it affects the dynamics of 
indirect reciprocity with and without generosity.
In addition, our analysis is based on computer simulations of the dynamics in finite populations. Instead, 
recent work has shown that analytical results are feasible in infinite populations if the players’ observations can 
be assumed to be  independent38,61. While the dynamics in finite populations is perhaps more relevant for applica-
tions, an analytical treatment of generosity is another potential venue for future research.
Furthermore, we have assumed an “aligned” version of forgiveness: players have a single probability value each 
for generosity in assessments ( g1 ) and actions ( g2 ), respectively. They do not differentiate between cases within 
one component of their social norm, i.e. do not apply less stochasticity in scenarios they deem less “forgivable”. 
Note that a non aligned version of generosity with different probability of forgiveness for different observations 
or actions would certainly be more realistic. For example, it might well be that cooperation with a person deemed 
as bad should be subject to forgiveness more often than defection against a good person. However, this also 
intuitively demands a higher cognitive capacity from the players, who then need to prioritize some assessments 
and actions over others, and need to decide what they think are unforgivable offenses. That is, they need a more 
involved sense of morality. This points to a direction of interesting future work, which can take into account the 
importance that players assign to different scenarios they might encounter rather than applying an element of 
randomness uniformly to their actions and assessments. Exploring such “non-aligned” generosity component-
wise would aid our understanding of which aspects of norms need to truly be set in stone, and which aspects 
deserve more flexibility in assessment and action. Our study with its negative result thus is only a first step 
towards understanding the effect of generosity for social norms.
Finally, previous work has shown that in more complex social situations, apologies are a necessary first step 
before forgiveness can occur. Without them, individuals lack discernment of what constitutes a justified or 
unjustified  defection62,63. This makes our results intuitive from a sociology perspective: without a person being 
able to observe the intent behind an action, forgiveness does not help in re-establishing cooperation. It thus 
would potentially be worthwhile to explore the use of apology strategies in indirect reciprocity, similar  to63, 
which analyzes direct reciprocity dynamics involving apology and forgiveness. Our study thus further serves to 
highlight the importance of shared information and coordination in a society when more complex social norms 
are applied. Simply acting in good faith every once in a while cannot balance out the intricate dynamics that 
result from disagreements in a population.
Methods
Reputation dynamics. We first describe how the reputations of players change over time. To this end, we 
assume social norms to be fixed for each individual. We record the reputations that players assign to one another 
in one image matrix M(t), which is updated in every step of the dynamics. An entry mij = 1 ( mij = 0 ) means that 
player i regards player j as good (bad), respectively. In the following, we always start with all entries mij = 1 , i.e. 
in a state where everyone assigns a good reputation to everyone else, no matter the social norm. In every round, 
a donor and recipient are chosen at random, and the donor can choose whether to confer a benefit b to the 
recipient at own cost c. Her action is dependent on her norm as well as the reputation she assigns to herself and 
the recipient. This action is observed by her co-players with individual probability q. This observation is subject 
to misperception with probability ε . The players who observe the interaction then update the donor’s reputa-
tion according to their assessment rules. These updates are recorded in the matrix M(t + 1) . We can iterate this 
process over many rounds and calculate the average image players have of each other. Specifically, if players have 
interacted for T rounds in total, the average image that player i’s assigns to player j is defined as 1T
∑T
t=1 mij(t) . 
The resulting average cooperation frequency x̂ij enables us to calculate players’ payoffs for a fixed social norm as
We illustrate our approach in Figs. 2 and 3. In both cases, the upper panels (a,c) show snapshots of the image 
matrix at time T = 2× 106 . The lower panels (b,d) show the respective average images. In Fig. S3, we further 
present the results of reputation dynamics in a homogeneous population of leading eight players, by showing 
the average cooperation rate of each leading eight norm against itself.
We want to point out that in general, “good” and “bad” are merely labels with no inherent meanings. In 
particular, for each of the leading eight strategies, one could also define “mirror strategies”. According to these 
mirror strategies, acceptable behavior would be rewarded with a “bad” reputation, and players would be more 
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how “assessment generosity” should be defined. After all, for the mirrors, assessment generosity should imply 
that forgiveness makes it more likely that players now assign a “bad” reputation to the respective player. How-
ever, in this study, we are only concerned with the leading eight strategies as defined by Ohtsuki and  Iwasa25. In 
their definition, the terms “good” and “bad” already have some intrinsic meaning. Here, “good” is considered to 
mean the reputation label that, according to the leading eight’s action rule, makes it more likely for the respec-
tive player to receive cooperation. In our model, players thus unambiguously prefer to be labeled as “good”. In 
that case, assessment generosity is straightforward to define. It means that players are more likely to assign good 
reputation to their peers.
As one of our results, we show that action generosity may be more conducive to the evolution of cooperation 
than assessment generosity. This may appear unsurprising, because action generosity immediately affects coop-
eration. In case of action generosity, each instance of generosity directly translates into an act of cooperation. 
In contrast, in the case of assessment generosity, each instance of generosity only affects the respective player’s 
reputation. Whether this improved reputation translates into more received cooperation depends on the player’s 
further interactions. However, for many of the presented results, we actually do not explore the impact of generos-
ity on the eventual cooperation rate. Rather, we explore how easily generosity can induce disagreements between 
leading eight players (Figs. 2 and 3), or how it affects the evolution of leading eight strategies (Fig. 4). Already 
on this level, we observe that action generosity is more favorable than assessment generosity. Furthermore, we 
show that even if action generosity by itself increases cooperation, we find that in most cases it actually has a 
negative effect on cooperation.
We also emphasize that our analysis technique is not limited to the restricted setup where only three social 
norms compete. The approach can be naturally extended by allowing population members to choose among 
additional norms. However, computational complexity increases rapidly in the number of considered social 
norms. Also, our results show that already when competing with only these two very simple other strategies, the 
leading eight norms are unstable. Thus, adding further social norms is unlikely to increase the stability of the 
leading eight norms and similarly unlikely to affect our conclusions.
Evolutionary dynamics. In a next step, we explore which social norms the individuals themselves choose 
to adopt when their norms are no longer fixed. To describe this process formally, we assume players change 
their norms over a separate, longer time scale. On this longer time scale, we assume individuals adopt new 
social norms based on a pairwise comparison  process45. According to this process, in every evolutionary time 
step, one player is randomly chosen from the population. With probability µ , with µ the mutation rate, this 
player picks a new social norm at random from the respective set of available norms. In this work, players can 
choose from three social norms, a given leading eight norm, ALLC, and ALLD. Meanwhile, with 1− µ , the focal 
player randomly chooses a role model from the population. If the focal player’s payoff according to Eq. (1) is 
given by πi and the role model’s payoff is πj , then the focal player adopts the role model’s norm with probability 
P(πi ,πj)=(1+exp[−s(πj−πi)])
−1 . The parameter s is called the strength of selection. When s is small, imita-
tion occurs largely at random. For larger s, however, players are most likely to imitate those role models with a 
higher payoff.
We note that in evolutionary game theory, imitation processes are often used as a standard model to describe 
the spread of strategies in a population. For this model to be sensible, it is necessary to assume however that 
players are able to infer their co-players’ strategies from their observed behaviors. This is straightforward for 
simple games, where strategies correspond to the action that a player chooses. It is less straightforward in games 
of indirect reciprocity. Here, individuals use more complex norms that are more difficult to learn by imitation. 
However, it may still be argued that players may be able to learn each other’s norms. For example, it is not unu-
sual to assume that people discuss their world views and moral guidelines with others. This is what we implicitly 
assume for this study. Instead of imitation, one could also consider an alternative model by assuming that social 
norms spread through a birth-death process, i.e. that parents pass on their own social norms to their children. 
However, for the function we use to model imitation, the imitation process is equivalent to a birth-death process 
with exponential fitness  mapping46. Thus, the results would not change.
This evolutionary process based on mutations and imitation is ergodic. Hence, it gives rise to a unique 
stationary distribution, which we refer to as the selection-mutation equilibrium. This equilibrium reflects how 
often each of the available social norms is adopted over time. In this work, we use the limit of rare mutations, 
which assumes that populations are homogeneous most of the time. When a mutation arises, it either fixes in the 
population or goes extinct before the next mutant appears. We can calculate this fixation probability of a mutant 
with social norm M into a resident population with social norm R explicitly  as64
Here, πM(k) and πR(k) are the respective payoffs of mutants (M) and residents (R) when k individuals in the 
population employ the mutant norm. This means that we can describe the evolution of the social norms between 
three available norms in the rare mutation limit as a Markov chain with three states. These three states correspond 
to the respective homogeneous populations, i.e. all players using ALLC, all using ALLD or all players using a 
leading eight norm. Given the pairwise fixation probabilities according to Eq. 2, the respective transition matrix 
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The stationary distribution of this transition matrix is the selection-mutation equilibrium of the process for 
rare  mutations50. Given this equilibrium, we can compute how often players cooperate on average by taking the 
average cooperation rate of each homogeneous population, and multiplying it by how often we are to observe 
the respective homogeneous population in equilibrium.
We use this approach in Fig. 4–Fig. S2, where we first simulated the reputation dynamics for all possible 
population compositions, (nL, nC , nD) , with N = nL + nC + nD = 50 and 106 steps each. Here, nL stands for the 
number of players using a (generous) leading eight norm, nC for the number of players using ALLC, and nD for 
the number of ALLD players. Payoffs are computed with Eq. 1, as explained in the subsection on the reputation 
dynamics.
Specific methods employed for the figures. Figure 2 shows the results of reputation dynamics in a popula-
tion of N=90 players. The population composition is as follows: 1/3 uses ALLD, 1/3 uses ALLC, and 1/3 uses 
a leading eight norm. We consider the cases of L1 (a,b) and L7 (c,d). We additionally differentiate between four 
parameter setups. For these setups we first distinguish whether information is perfect or noisy (i.e., whether 
ε = 0 and q = 1 , or ε = 0.05 and q = 0.9 ). In addition, we distinguish whether or not players engage in assess-
ment generosity (i.e., whether g1 = 0.05 or g1 = 0 , while g2 = 0 throughout).
Figure 3 uses exactly the same method as Fig. 2, but considers the case that players use action generosity 
( g1 = 0, g2 = 0.05 ) instead of assessment generosity.
In Fig. 4, we show the abundance of ALLC, ALLD and either L1 or L7 in the selection-mutation equilib-
rium. We compare a scenario without generosity ( g1 = g2 = 0 ) to scenarios with assessment generosity only 
( g1 = 0.05, g2 = 0 ), action generosity only ( g1 = 0, g2 = 0.05 ), and symmetric generosity ( g1 = g2 = 0.05 ). 
Parameters are b = 5, c = 1, s = 1, ε = 0.05, q = 0.9.
In Fig. 5, we systematically explore the effect of generosity on cooperation in the selection-mutation equi-
librium for all leading eight norms. We use the same baseline parameters as in Fig. 4, while varying both assess-
ment (y-axis) and action (x-axis) generosity in steps of 0.05 between 0 and 0.5. To visualize the impact of action 
generosity on the three norms L1 , L2 , and L7 in more detail, we also ran more fine-grained simulations where we 
varied g2 in steps of 0.01, while g1 = 0 . These results are presented in the inset panels a, b, g.
For Fig. 6, we again employed the same method as in Figs. 4 and 5. Here, we rerun the simulations for vary-
ing benefit b , noise ε , and observation probability q. We again compare a, the baseline without generosity 
( g1 = g2 = 0 ) to the three scenarios of (b), assessment generosity only ( g1 = 0.05, g2 = 0 ), (c), action generosity 
only ( g1 = 0, g2 = 0.05 ), and (d), both kinds of generosity ( g1 = g2 = 0.05 ). The other parameters remain the 
same as in the previous figures.
Figure S2 explores the effect of generosity in a perfect information scenario, for an error rate of ε = 0 and 
an observation probability of q = 1 . We once more consider three scenarios: assessment generosity only with 
g1 = 0.05 (a), action generosity only with g2 = 0.05 (b), and symmetric generosity, with g1 = g2 = 0.05 (c). 
Methods employed are as in the previous evolutionary figures Fig. 4, 5, 6. All other parameters remain the same.
For Fig. S3, we vary generosity levels in all three scenarios (assessment generosity only, action generosity 
only, symmetric generosity) when considering reputation dynamics in a homogeneous population of leading 
eight players with noisy environment ( ε = 0.05 , q = 0.9 ). We plot the average cooperation rate of each employed 
leading eight norm against itself.
Data availability
The raw data generated for the main text is available from the authors upon request. All simulations and numeri-
cal calculations have been performed with Python 2.7. The Python script used to simulate the reputation dynam-
ics and calculate the selection-mutation equilibrium as well as average cooperation rates is available online at 
https:// osf. io/ hw6ay/? view_ only= 3802a a5e3a 0f400 b90cc 004a4 61f99 9e!.
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